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Abstract 
Over the past decade, numerous engineered credit events and cases of market 
participants manipulating bond prices to influence CDS auction payouts have occurred. 
These cases have become increasingly common, and the CFTC has stated they may 
constitute market manipulation and undermine not only the CDS market but also the credit 
derivative and default markets. Although there is a plethora of news and media coverage 
on publicized cases, there is no previous empirical research on evidence of these practices. 
This paper is motivated by the desire to determine if there is indirect evidence of bond price 
manipulation around default and of market participants’ attempts to favorably move CDS’s 
underlying bond prices to achieve more profitable positions around default and emerging 
from CDS auctions. The analysis is performed by analyzing the effect of a bonds’ inclusion 
in CDS auctions on bond return volatility around the time of default while controlling for 
credit risk, illiquidity, firm fundamentals, and other bond-level controls. I find that bond 
return volatility around default is much higher as a result of a bond’s inclusion in a CDS 
auction, which serves as indirect evidence of bond price manipulation around default as 
market participants strive for more profitable CDS auction outcomes and possibly of 
manufactured credit events. Consistent with previous literature, I also find that bond 
illiquidity significantly impacts bond return volatility. My results are robust to propensity 
score matching, implementing double-robust estimators, and controlling for any time-
varying cross-sectionally-invariant fluctuations in bond return volatility.  
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1. Introduction
“The gambit is fiendlishly clever. It is the debt equivalent of a controlled explosion: 
offering a struggling company favourable financing … to convince it to intentionally 
default in a way that will trigger payouts on CDS contracts, but without bringing down the 
whole company.” 
- Financial Times (June 2018)1
Credit default swaps (CDS) are default insurance contracts that aim to transfer the 
credit exposure of bonds and other fixed income products between buyers of protection 
(CDS buyers) and sellers of protection (CDS sellers). CDS are one of the most significant 
financial product developments in the past 25 years, gaining not only pervasiveness but 
also regulation and policy scrutiny since creation. Since their creation in 1994 by JPM, 
CDS have been used by investors for a variety of purposes, ranging from insurance and 
hedging to speculation and arbitrage. Although originally intended as a method of 
insurance and default risk mitigation for banks, CDS have increasingly become used in 
speculation and arbitrage by banks, hedge funds, and other financial institutions. According 
to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), as of December 2017, global CDS markets 
have a notional amount outstanding of $9.354 trillion and a gross market value of $304 
billion. This is down from $61.2 trillion notional outstanding at the end of 2007 before the 
Great Financial Crisis.2 
The Great Financial Crisis drew significant attention to CDS and other credit 
derivatives after the high number of large-scale incidents in 2008, beginning with the 
collapse of Bear Stearns. In 2008, CDS trades were executed over the counter (OTC), 
1 The Financial Times, 2018, “Debt equivalent of a controlled explosion helped Blackstone edge out 
rivals,” Jun 5. 
2 See the semiannual OTC derivatives statistics, Bank for International Settlements, December 2017. 
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because a central exchange or clearing house did not exist. This prompted the Depository 
Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) to publish information on CDS trades on a weekly 
basis (DTCC (2008)).3 Previously, in 2001, data provider Markit had also made pricing 
and other information available on CDS contracts. In addition to increased transparency, 
the CDS market experienced several other fundamental changes to address concerns about 
the product’s risk after 2008, accommodate market growth, and improve efficiency. More 
specifically, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) introduced (1) 
central clearing houses (the counterparty to both sides of a CDS transaction) operated by 
the InterContinental Exchange (ICE) to reduce the counterparty risk faced by both buyers 
and sellers, and (2) the international standardization of CDS contracts (known as the “CDS 
Big Bang”) to improve the infrastructure of the CDS market and improve efficiency 
(Markit (2009)).  Ultimately, the industry experienced consequential change in market size 
and structure over the course of several months, and even greater change over the last 
decade (Aldasoro and Ehlers (2018)). 
The success of these reforms to decrease risk and increase transparency and 
regulation relies on understanding how the CDS market operates and the efficiency of the 
market (Chernov, Gorbenko, Makarov (2013)). As a result, there has been significant 
research on CDS premia and spreads (Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005)), default and 
recovery from the term structure of CDS spreads (Jaskowski and McAleer (2012), Pan and 
Singleton (2008)), CDS valuation (Duffie (1999)), insider trading (Acharya and Johnson 
(2007)), counterparty risk (Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff (2009); Duffie and Zhu (2011)), 
and other topics on the CDS market. More recently, some research has been devoted to 
3 See DTCC, 2008, Global Trade Repository, OTC Derivative Reporting. 
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understanding CDS auctions and settlements and their possible biases and inefficiencies. 
Specifically, Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) and Du and Zhu (2016) analyze the 
two-stage CDS auction design theoretically and empirically and determine that the current 
auction design results in biased bond prices and inefficient allocations. 
Despite the targeted CDS market reforms and research on CDS auctions and 
settlement procedures, there remains inefficiencies, biases, and manipulations. Since 2009, 
there have been several cases of bond price manipulation influencing CDS payouts and 
“engineered credit events.” In an engineered credit event, a market participant synthetically 
triggers (manufactured credit event) or prevents (debt orphaning or other CDS 
manipulation) the payout of a company’s CDS to benefit one or more financial institutions 
and/or the company. There are also cases where market participants, usually CDS buyers 
or sellers, push for better positions emerging from CDS auctions, namely by moving bond 
prices favorably before the auction. For example, in Goldman’s duel with GSO (Blackstone 
Group’s credit hedge fund unit), it tried to push up the bond price to reduce its payout on 
Hovnanian CDS after GSO helped manufacture Hovnanian’s credit event. 
Although these manipulation cases have become more common, with three public 
cases in the past twelve months (Hovnanian, Sears, and McClatchy), they are neither 
explicitly fair market activity nor using CDS for the way in which it was designed. 
According to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), they may constitute 
market manipulation and undermine not only the CDS market but also the credit derivative 
and default markets.4 Following the Hovnanian credit event, Simon Firth, a partner at 
                                                          
4 Doran, Josh, 2018, “Manufactured Credit Events May ‘Damage’ CDS Market: CFTC,” IFRe, Apr 25. 
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Linklaters, said to IFR (International Financing Review), “it is significant because if 
manufactured defaults were to happen left, right and center, that could cause a collapse of 
confidence in the credit derivative market.”5 Further conversation and casual empiricism 
suggest that the ramifications of engineered credit events and bond price manipulation 
could lead to decreased confidence in the CDS market, lower levels of trading activity, 
increased hedging risk, greater marketplace inefficiencies, and reduced market 
transparency. 
This paper is motivated by the desire to determine if there is indirect evidence of 
bond price manipulation around default and of market participants’ attempts to favorably 
move CDS’s underlying bond prices to achieve more profitable positions around default 
and emerging from CDS auctions. This paper fills the gap in existing literature on the study 
of empirical evidence of such manipulation and will be the first to examine bond return 
volatility around the time of default. Previous research into direct evidence of these 
practices is sparse because of the limited data and small number of revealed cases 
(Hovnanian, Sears, McClatchy, etc.), but CDS’s reference securities provide more data that 
can be used to investigate possible evidence of market participants manipulating the 
market.  
This paper aims to determine if there is indirect evidence of the manipulation of 
CDS’s underlying bond prices by comparing the volatility of bond returns around the time 
of default for bonds that are included in CDS auctions (either because they have CDS 
written on them or their reference entity does). This analysis is performed by computing 
                                                          
5 Scigliuzzo, Davide, 2018, “CFTC Steps into Debate on Voluntary Defaults,” Thomson Reuters, Apr 27. 
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bond return volatility from before default to when a CDS auction would typically occur 
and running regressions motivated by Bao and Pan (2013), with controls for credit risk, 
illiquidity, firm fundamentals, and other bond-level controls. Propensity score matching, 
double robust estimators, and regressions with time fixed-effects are then used to further 
determine the effect of CDS auction on bond return volatility and as robustness tests. 
Looking at bond return volatility rather than just abnormal bond returns is 
motivated by Goldman and GSO’s duel in which both firms tried to manipulate bond prices 
before the CDS auction but in opposite directions. Thus, for each reference security, it is 
unknown what hedge funds’ net CDS or bond positions are at the time of default, and 
therefore which direction they are attempting to move prices. Further, because there are 
participants on both sides of the trade, there are likely efforts to move prices in both 
directions, thus creating abnormal return volatility but not necessarily net abnormal returns. 
I hypothesize that if bond price manipulation and/or manufactured credit events are 
present, the bond return volatility will be higher for bonds that are included in CDS auctions 
than their counterparts that are not because of market participants’ attempts to move prices 
favorably both prior to auction and prior to default. The bond default data and bond pricing 
data for this paper are collected from Moody’s Default and Recovery Database (DRD) and 
FINRA’s TRACE (Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine), respectively. The 
bond data is matched to Compustat to obtain firm fundamental data. The CDS data is 
obtained from Markit and the other data is collected from regular data sources, such as 
CRSP, U.S. Treasury's Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT) series, and Bloomberg. 
First, this paper contributes to the increasing evidence of and debate over 
manufactured credit events. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to make a rigorous 
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attempt to uncover evidence of market participants manipulating bond prices around 
default and in CDS auctions. Notably, this paper finds indirect empirical evidence of the 
manipulation of bond returns for bonds in CDS auctions and therefore possibly 
manufactured credit events. I use bond return volatility as a measure of indirect evidence 
of market participants manipulating bond returns before default and from default to auction 
to achieve more profitable positions emerging from CDS auctions. The average annual 
bond return volatility across all bonds around the time of default is 99.6% to 139.8%. After 
controlling for bond illiquidity, credit risk, firm fundamentals, and other bond-level 
controls using baseline regressions, I find that a bond included in a CDS auction is 
associated with a higher bond return volatility of 31.2 to 63.8 percentage points around the 
time of default, with the highest CDS auction bond volatility in the six months prior to 
default.  
These results are robust to propensity score matching (PSM), in which a CDS 
auction is associated with a greater annual volatility of 26.2 to 114.0 percentage points.6 
Using PSM, I measure the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET or ATT) and 
average treatment effect (ATE). I estimate that the average bond return volatility for a CDS 
auction bond is 75.4 to 157.5 percentage points higher than if it is not in a CDS auction 
(ATET) and that the bond return volatility around the time of default is 63.7 to 191.1 
percentage points higher when a bond is included in a CDS auction (ATE), depending on 
the time period around default. Furthermore, these results persist when using double-robust 
estimators. The ATE calculated using double-robust estimators of CDS auction on bond 
6 Measured using the PSM matched sample based on bonds’ propensity to be included in CDS auction and 
running the same baseline regressions as done with the unmatched sample.  
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return volatility estimates that bond return volatility around the time of default is 14.6 to 
75.7 percentage points higher when a bond is in a CDS auction. Lastly, to control for any 
time-varying cross-sectionally-invariant variations in bond return volatility that are 
potentially unexplained by my controls, such as market-wide fluctuations, I run my 
baseline regressions with time fixed-effects. I find that CDS auction is significantly 
positively related to bond return volatility with time fixed-effects and positively related to 
bond return volatility with time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by distinct 
default event. This paper therefore finds that bond return volatility around default is higher 
as a result of a bond’s inclusion in a CDS auction, serving as indirect evidence of bond 
price manipulation around default as market participants strive for more profitable CDS 
auction outcomes and possibly manufactured credit events.  
Second, this paper contributes to the growing literature on CDS pricing and trading, 
ties between CDS auctions and bond pricing at default, and corporate bond return volatility. 
Although there has been a large amount of studies on the CDS auction settlement procedure 
(Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013); Du and Zhu (2016); Gupta and Sundaram 
(2011); and Peivandi (2015)) and structural models of default (Jones, Mason, and 
Rosenfeld (1984); Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004)), and the credit spread puzzle (Huang 
and Huang (2003); Elias, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2014), Bhar and Handzic (2008); and 
Feldhutter and Schaefer (2018); Bao and Pan (2013); and Chen, Lesmond, and Wei 
(2007)), there is only one paper to my knowledge connecting CDS auctions and bond 
pricing at default (Helwege et al. (2009)). Thus, this paper is the first to model factors 
influencing bond return volatility around the time of default and investigate the effect of a 
bond’s inclusion in a CDS auction on bond return volatility before and after default. The 
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results of this paper suggest bond illiquidity and a bond’s inclusion in a CDS auction have 
the greatest significant impact on bond return volatility around the time of default. Only 
some firm fundamentals are significantly related to bond return volatility for the two of the 
time periods around default. However, the firms I am analyzing are all near default, and so 
there is not a wide range of firm attributes as there is in Bao and Pan (2013).  
Although there is little research examining bond returns and volatility around the 
time of default, there is extensive research on corporate bond returns and volatility, return 
and volatility factors, and credit spreads. Significant research focuses on structural models 
of default; Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) and Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) find 
that these structural models do not match the magnitudes of credit spreads. Specifically, 
Huang and Huang (2003) determine that numerous structural models underestimate 
corporate bond yield spreads when matched to historical default probabilities. This 
dislocation, named “the credit spread puzzle,” has attracted significant research since 
Huang and Huang (2003).  This research endeavors to explain the credit spread puzzle, 
particularly through model dynamics, see for example Elias, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski 
(2014), Bhar and Handzic (2008), and Feldhutter and Schaefer (2018). Alternative 
literature suggests an illiquidity component, such as in Bao and Pan (2013) and Chen, 
Lesmond, and Wei (2007). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a review of the 
literature on CDS auction settlement structure, inefficiencies, and biases; structural models 
of default; and measuring excess price volatility and its determinants. Section 3 presents a 
review of the news stories on publicized manufactured and engineered credit events while 
Section 4 provides a detailed description of the current CDS auction structure. Section 5 
13
describes the databases used, the creation of the dataset, variable construction, and the 
dataset, and Section 6 provides the empirical strategy used in this paper. Section 7 presents 
and explains the empirical results using baseline regressions, propensity score matching, 
and double-robust estimators, and Section 8 concludes and offers future research 
opportunities. 
2. Literature Review
While empirical and quantitative research on engineered credit events and bond 
return volatility is limited, CDS market structure, trading, valuation, and settlement have 
been studied extensively, see, for example, Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Jaskowski 
and McAleer (2012), Pan and Singleton (2008), Duffie (1999), Acharya and Johnson 
(2007), Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff (2009), and Duffie and Zhu (2011). More 
specifically, Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013), Du and Zhu (2016), Gupta and 
Sundaram (2011), and Peivandi (2015) examine CDS auctions and determine biases and 
inefficiencies resulting from the auction structure. In their seminal paper, Chernov, 
Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) (CGM), analyze CDS settlement auctions theoretically and 
evaluate them empirically. To conduct their analysis, they extend the strategic bidding 
models of Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993). CGM (2013) determine that, 
because of strategic bidding from participants holding CDS, the final auction price may be 
above or below the fair bond price. They calculate undervaluation to occur most 
commonly, with auctions undervaluing bonds by an average of 6% on the auction day. 
14
Similar to CGM (2013), Gupta and Sundaram (2011) (GS) also find a V-shaped 
price pattern, where final prices from CDS auctions are lower than bond prices before and 
after auction dates. GS (2011) also determine that information from the auction, 
particularly the auction’s final price, is integral to price formation after the auction and that 
bond return volatility typically increases after the auction (compared to pre-auction). They 
hypothesize that this is due to the entrance of new, informed investors post-auction. 
CGM (2013) also shares several common features with Peivandi (2015), but 
Peivandi (2015) uses a different theoretical model of a mechanism-design approach with 
emphasis on auction participation. Both CGM (2013) and Peivandi (2015) find price 
impact in the second stage of the CDS auction, but, Peivandi (2015) also shows the only 
way to guarantee full participation in CDS auctions is through a fixed price. Thus, full 
participation and price discovery cannot both be accomplished. Du and Zhu (2016) (DZ) 
offer complementary results to CGM (2013) and Peivandi (2015), evaluating CDS auctions 
with both a theoretical and market design perspective. DZ (2016) determine an additional 
cause of biased prices and inefficient allocations in CDS auctions: specific types of traders 
are unable to participate due to certain restrictions. DZ (2016) also find that, because a 
greater CDS position (in absolute value) relieves CDS auction’s first stage participation 
constraints, traders have excessive CDS positions before defaults. Ultimately, CGM, 
(2013), GS (2011), Peivandi (2015), and DZ (2016) all agree the current design of CDS 
auctions can lead to biased prices and inefficient allocations. 
While the aforementioned papers evaluate the design of CDS auctions, Helwege et 
al. (2009) connect the CDS auction mechanism and outcomes with corporate bond prices 
and returns at default and just before recovery. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) propose 
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that CDS auction results are superior to bond prices at default as indicators of actual 
recovery rates because bond spreads are significantly more sensitive to illiquidity factors 
than CDS spreads. However, there are some arguments that the greater liquidity of the CDS 
market is not entirely passed on to CDS auctions, and both recovery rates may not 
accurately reflect actual recovery rates. Helwege et al. (2009) investigate if the recovery 
basis is large enough to “drive apart” the pricing of credit risk in the CDS market and 
secondary bond market. Using historical data, they determine that the estimates of recovery 
from CDS auction prices and the secondary bond market prices are close, suggesting little 
evidence of a large recovery basis. They also find little evidence that the illiquidity of the 
bond market affects how closely the bond market price “tracks” the auction price. 
While Helwege et al. (2009) conclude that the bond price the day before or day of 
the auction is extremely close to the final recovery price in the CDS auction, they calculate 
several cases of abnormally high or low bond returns from the time of default to the auction 
day. In their paper, they do not investigate the source of these returns and/or volatility, and 
there is little other research examining the returns and return volatility of bonds from 
default to auction. The abnormality of these returns and return volatility around the time of 
default could indicate manipulation by market players, which this paper is the first to 
examine. This paper seeks to expand upon Helwege et al. (2009) by calculating bond return 
volatility around the time of default for a larger dataset of bonds both included in and not 
included in CDS auctions. 
Although there is little research examining bond returns and volatility around the 
time of default, there is extensive research on corporate bond returns and volatility, return 
and volatility factors, and credit spreads. Significant research focuses on structural models 
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of default; Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) and Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) find 
that these structural models do not match the magnitudes of credit spreads. Specifically, 
Huang and Huang (2003) determine that numerous structural models underestimate 
corporate bond yield spreads when matched to historical default probabilities. This 
dislocation, named “the credit spread puzzle,” has attracted significant research since 
Huang and Huang (2003).  This research endeavors to explain the credit spread puzzle, 
particularly through model dynamics, see, for example, Elias, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski 
(2014), Bhar and Handzic (2008), and Feldhutter and Schaefer (2018). Alternative 
literature suggests an illiquidity component, such as in Bao and Pan (2013) and Chen, 
Lesmond, and Wei (2007). 
Bao and Pan (2013) confirm excess volatility in corporate bond and CDS returns 
and run a series of regressions to determine the cause of this excess volatility. To determine 
excess bond volatility, they compare bond volatility from the Merton model implied 
volatility, calculated from an extension of the Merton (1974) model using stochastic 
interest rates with Treasury bond and equity return volatilities, with empirical volatility 
from monthly returns, calculated from the transaction size-weighted prices. Bessembinder 
et al. (2009) recommend calculating prices as transaction size-weighted average prices to 
minimize the impact of bid-ask spreads in prices. Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) 
and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) further expand this research, showing high, negative 
autocovariance in the corporate bond market, suggestive of a large effective bid-ask spread 
which would dominate volatilities over short horizons and small trades. Bao and Pan 
(2013) determine that empirical volatility of credit securities is higher than Merton model 
implied volatility due to illiquidity rather than firm fundamentals. Consistent with Collin-
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Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008), Bao and Pan 
(2013) confirm both that the Merton model offers good estimates of fundamentals in the 
equity and corporate bond markets and that there are still some factors of debt returns and 
credit spreads that remain uncaptured in the Merton model. 
The regression analysis and control variables used in this paper are primarily 
motivated by Bao and Pan (2013), as well as the aforementioned papers.  This paper 
extends the work of Bao and Pan (2013) by examining empirical bond return volatility 
specifically around the time of default. It will also be the first to compare these metrics for 
bonds included in CDS auction and bonds that are not included and determine if there is 
indirect evidence of market participants manipulating bond returns and CDS for more 
favorable CDS auction outcomes.  
 
3. News Review 
While there is no previous research on determining empirical evidence of such 
manipulation, there has been significant media coverage, conversation, and debate about 
whether these events constitute market manipulation (Bloomberg, WSJ, Reuters). Perhaps 
the most topical case is the US homebuilder Hovnanian Enterprises Inc. trade in January 
2018. Blackstone Group’s credit hedge fund unit, GSO Capital Partners, offered 
Hovnanian a low-cost loan with the condition that Hovnanian default on a portion of its 
debt and issue weird new bonds to trigger the CDS and generate a large payout on the $300 
million CDS position held by GSO.7 These weird bonds offered very low coupons which 
                                                          
7 Levine, Matt, 2018, “When Cleverness Becomes Manipulation,” Bloomberg, Apr 26. 
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made the bonds extremely cheap and would maximize CDS payouts. Hovnanian agreed to 
default on a portion of its debt by missing a bond payment, known as a “manufactured 
default.” Hovnanian was not in default, but GSO’s loan rate was significantly cheaper and 
therefore more attractive than others’ offers. Goldman, one of the CDS sellers on the trade, 
tried to push up the bond price to reduce its CDS payout. After another CDS seller, Solus 
Asset Management, tried to sue GSO, GSO altered its offer so that Hovnanian no longer 
had to default on a portion of its debt. Hovnanian paid the interest it had skipped and thus 
did not trigger the CDS payout. 
Although GSO was not able to accomplish its manufactured default trade with 
Hovnanian, the hedge fund conducted a similar trade in 2013 with Spanish gaming 
company Codere. GSO offered a loan to Codere, structured in a way that would result in a 
payout on the CDS GSO held. The loan required Codere to pay an interest payment two 
days late, triggering the CDS “failure to pay” clause. Codere was willing to take the loan 
to ease its restructuring debate with bondholders, since many bondholders would gain from 
the CDS they simultaneously held. This “failure-to-pay" manufactured credit event 
resulted in a $197 million payment to holders of the CDS.8 
GSO’s manufactured credit events are only the tip of the iceberg as Sujeet Indap at 
the Financial Times writes, “US companies are facing an escalating threat from activist 
debt investors, who want to push them into default to make a profit from bearish bets on 
their bonds.”9 Codere is often regarded as the “precursor to iHeart,” since the 
                                                          
8 Ruhle, Stephanie, Mary Childs, and Julie Miecamp, 2013, “Blackstone Unit Wins in No-Lose Codere 
Trade: Corporate Finance,” Bloomberg, Oct 23.  
9 Indap, Sujeet, 2018, “USA Inc Faces Growing Threat from Activist Debt Investors,” Financial Times, 
Sept 18. 
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iHeartCommunications, Inc. case triggered the same “failure-to-pay” clause. iHeart chose 
not to repay the $57.1 million of principal on its 2016 senior unsecured notes held by its 
own affiliate but repaid the $192.9 million of principal on the same note held by outside 
investors. While some of these cases offer a benefit to the company defaulting, other more 
severe cases do not. For example, at the end of 2017, Aurelius Capital Management, who 
held a significant bond and CDS position in Windstream, began a legal case arguing the 
company had been in default for two years to trigger profits from its CDS position. As 
these cases increase in frequency and severity, concern is rising that more and more 
financial institutions will follow GSO, Aurelius, etc., in performing this “net-short debt 
activism.” 
Hedge funds have also manipulated the CDS market in the opposite direction, in 
which a hedge fund offers a distressed company a deal that helps keep the company afloat 
and prevents triggering the CDS payout. Bolton and Oehmke (2009) investigate the 
classification of these restructuring deals and their effect on CDS contract prices, creditor 
behavior, and credit market outcomes. They determine that, while classifying debt 
restructuring as a credit event reduces restructuring inefficiencies that result from the 
empty creditor problem, it also eliminates the economic gains from the use of CDS as a 
commitment device. Both Amherst Holdings in 2009 and Radioshack’s CDS writers in 
2014 similarly sold CDS and used the proceeds to buy up the company’s bonds or offer a 
cheap loan to prevent default, a form of restructuring.  
ESL Investment Inc. and Chatham Asset Management designed more creative 
engineered credit events in May and April of 2018, respectively. ESL, the biggest Sears 
shareholder at the time, offered to buy some of Sears’ businesses in exchange for Sears 
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buying back a portion of its own lower priced debt, resulting in large profits for CDS 
writers that were betting on Sears staying afloat for the next year.10  Chatham offered to 
refinance most of McClatchy’s debt with two new loans under one of its subsidiaries, 
creating what is termed an “orphaned contract” for its CDS because CDS holders would 
hold insurance on an entity without significant debt. If the deal had gone through, Chatham, 
who had been selling CDS and buying up the underlying bonds to raise prices, would be 
the seller of insurance against a nearly impossible default because of the lack of debt. The 
two new loans would also be sold to Chatham at a premium to par because of its own 
buying of McClatchy’s bonds. 11 
All of these engineered credit event cases are one of two scenarios: (1) buying CDS 
(long protection, short credit) and triggering the CDS clause or (2) selling CDS (short 
protection, long credit) and preventing default. Both scenarios represent potential 
manipulation in the credit derivatives market. The CFTC has voiced their opinion, stating 
“intentional defaults, which are not tied to a company’s financial health, could amount to 
‘market manipulation’ and ‘severely damage’ the CDS market.”12 The ISDA board also 
published a statement in April, “we believe that narrowly tailored defaults, those that are 
designed to result in CDS payments that do not reflect the creditworthiness of the 
underlying corporate borrower, could negatively impact the efficiency, reliability, and 
fairness of the overall CDS market.”13 Thus, these CDS and bond price manipulations, 
                                                          
10 Boston, Claire, and Sridhar Natarajan, 2018, “Sears Looks Like the Next Company With a Head-
Scratching CDS Trade,” Bloomberg, May 22.  
11Natarajan, Sridhar, 2018, “This Hedge Fund Trade Is Stirring Fresh Controversy in the CDS Market,” 
Bloomberg, Apr 2013. 
12 Scigliuzzo, Davide, 2018, “CFTC Steps into Debate on Voluntary Defaults,” Thomson Reuters, Apr 27. 
13 Internatinoal Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., 2018, “ISDA Board Statement on Narrowly 
Tailored Credit Events,” Apr 11.  
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many of which are unexposed, are an ongoing problem that future regulation may or may 
not be able to address.  
4. Overview of CDS Auction Design
CDS auctions determine the payments by CDS sellers to CDS buyers after the default
of bonds. Auctions are used to settle CDS trades of defaulting firms to improve settlement 
efficiency and determine a uniform recovery price for the underlying debt, minimizing 
“recovery basis risk,” which would otherwise occur if the recovery were not the same for 
all instruments. Investors have the option of cash settlement or effectively physical 
settlement because bonds can be traded in the auction. All CDS trades in the auction are 
cash settled, where in the physical settlement option a CDS buyer receives the principal 
balance outstanding (par in this case) from the trading of the underlying cash obligation 
(Creditex and Markit (2010)).  For example, if there is a 30% recovery rate, the CDS buyer 
receives 70% of par. 
Because of the requirement to settle in cash with an option to effectively physically 
settle, CDS auctions are an unusual two-stage process (Helwege et al. (2009)). In the first 
stage of CDS auctions, dealers provide a two-way quote for the defaulted assets and 
physical settlement requests are made (requests to buy or sell deliverable obligations at the 
final price). The dealers’ quotes are used to determine the initial market midpoint and the 
physical settlement requests are summed to measure open interest, which is used in the 
second stage. 
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The initial market midpoint, size and direction of open interest, and adjustment 
amounts are published on Creditfixing’s website within 30 minutes. Then, dealers and 
investors have 2-3 hours to decide if they would like to place limit orders on the deliverable 
obligations (and if so at what level) in the second stage of the auction. The initial market 
submissions on the relevant side are used as limit orders in the second stage of the auction 
as well. Limit order bids/offers are bound by the “cap,” usually half of the bid-offer spread. 
Further, if the open interest is to buy, a limit offer’s lower bound is the initial market 
midpoint minus the cap (any offers below are bumped to this value). If the open interest is 
to sell, a limit bid’s upper bound is the initial market midpoint plus the cap (any bids above 
are knocked to this value). 
Next, if the open interest is to buy/sell, the lowest/highest ‘sell’/’buy’ limit order is 
matched with the open interest that is equal in size. The next lowest/highest order is then 
matched, and the process continues until all open interest has been matched, in which the 
last match is the final price. If all limit orders are matched first, the final price is par if open 
interest is to buy and zero if open interest is to sell. Further, if the final limit order is greater 
than the initial market midpoint plus the cap or less than the initial market minus the cap, 
the final price will be the initial market midpoint plus or minus the cap, respectively 
(Creditex and Markit (2010)). 
Although Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) and Du and Zhu (2016) 
demonstrate that there is not a huge amount of bias in the final auction price, they ignore 
market participants’ activity in the bond market before default and even between default 
and auction. In the current CDS auction design, participants in the first stage influence the 
quantity of bonds to be auctioned (the open interest) in the second stage of the auction, 
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therefore influencing the final price. Because dealers’ markets create the initial market 
midpoint, dealers can influence the upper/lower bounds for pricing limit orders and the 
final auction price as well. Second stage participants (those placing limit orders) may hold 
derivatives on the assets being auctioned and thus, CDS auction participants may have 
large incentives to manipulate prices to gain from their existing positions, a major bias 
inherent in the current structure of CDS auctions. 
Specifically, a company’s lowest-priced debt is typically used to determine credit 
derivative payouts, and so when an institution bids up the bond price (Chatham/McClatchy 
and Goldman/Hovnanian) or takes out the lowest-priced debt (ESL/Sears), it dramatically 
reduces the CDS payout in the event of default. On the other hand, if a hedge fund owned 
a large CDS position, it would desire the bond price to decrease so it would receive a larger 
CDS payout after auction. This hedge fund could submit a large market sell order in the 
first stage of the auction and, depending on other market participants’ orders, possibly 
cause the net open interest to be selling and favorably move the CDS payout. But, the extent 
to which participants can bid or ask for bonds in the first stage of the auction is limited by 
their CDS position size, so participants cannot submit an order to sell a large amount if 
they only hold a small CDS position. However, CDS auction outcomes are also partly 
determined by how much these bonds trade before auction. Therefore, pre-default and pre-
auction bond manipulation could be an extremely effective tactic for market participants 
in order to achieve favorable CDS auction outcomes.  
Collectively, CGM, (2013), GS (2011), Peivandi (2015), and DZ (2016) demonstrate 
that the current design of CDS auctions can lead to biased prices and inefficient allocations. 
CGM (2013) propose altering current auctions with the introduction of a pro-rata allocation 
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rule and a conditional price cap to minimize mispricing. DZ (2016) also propose a method 
to improve current CDS auctions, although they recognize it is not the optimal method in 
practice. DZ (2016) recommend an alternative double auction design (as opposed to the 
current one-sided design) that would offer more efficient price discovery and allocations. 
 
5. Data 
5.1 Data Collection and Sources 
To analyze corporate bond return volatility around default, I first use data from 
Moody’s Default & Recovery Database (DRD). Moody’s Investor Service uses DRD’s 
issuer, default, and recovery data as the basis of their default research, which is used 
globally. This dataset is ideal for my purposes because it provides detailed coverage of 
default and recovery data for debts and corporate entities. I use this dataset to identify 
defaulted entities and issuances from 2005 to 2018 and define this as my defaulted bonds 
dataset. Each defaulted entity is dated by Moody’s rating agency default date. For each 
entity, DRD provides the entity’s industry, a default description blurb, the type of default, 
and resolution (if applicable). From DRD, it can be determined on which issuances each 
entity defaulted, the issuance-specific default date, and bond issuance characteristics, such 
as seniority, coupon, market, prior year’s rating, and default price where applicable. 
Next, I use Markit CDS data to determine which entities have CDS traded. This 
dataset consists of currently or historically traded CDS and provides the corresponding 
entity CUSIP, redcode, ticker, reference entity, jurisdiction, etc. I use this dataset as a 
reference for which bonds have reference entities that currently have or previously have 
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had CDS trading. To determine which bonds are included in CDS auctions at the time of 
the bond and reference entity’s default, I use Creditfixings and ISDA’s CDS Index 
Protocols to identify CDS auction data. For each defaulted entity with auctionable CDS, 
the Protocol provides market participants with a method to address the settlement issues 
on the entity’s credit derivative products through the CDS auction process. 
The Protocol identifies each deliverable obligation to be priced and settled in the 
auction. The details of this auction settlement process, dealer bid/offers, initial market 
midpoint, net open interest, and final auction price are publicly available from the 
Creditfixings website. I construct my own CDS auction dataset consisting of each auction’s 
deliverable obligations. I then add all senior (unsecured and non-subordinated) deliverable 
bonds in my CDS auction dataset to my defaulted bonds dataset that are not already 
included in the latter. Although these additional bonds are not necessarily in default, they 
are subject to the same possible price manipulation around the time of the issuer’s default 
because of their inclusion in CDS auction. 
The bond pricing data for the defaulted and deliverable bonds in this paper are 
acquired from FINRA’s TRACE (Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine). This 
dataset exists because of regulatory changes that aimed to add greater transparency in 
corporate bond markets. FINRA, successor to the NASD, regulates trading in equities, 
corporate bonds, securities, and options and reports OTC corporate trades. This dataset is 
optimal for my purposes because it provides “time-stamped” trading activity containing 
the clean price and par value traded which I use to calculate daily bond returns and volatility 
as well as several bond illiquidity measures. However, the par value traded is capped at $1 
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million+ for speculative great bonds and $5 million+ for investment grade bonds.14 Nearly 
all of the bonds in my sample defaulted after the NASD implemented Phase III of bond 
transaction reporting on February 7, 2005, which expanded reporting requirements to 
approximately 99% of total U.S. corporate bond market activity in over 30,000 securities.  
I match my defaulted bonds dataset, which includes bond characteristics from 
DRD, with the bond pricing data from TRACE. The DRD bond characteristics data is 
crosschecked with Bloomberg Historical Data, and I fill in missing values where 
applicable, namely for deliverable obligations from CDS auctions.15 DRD also provides 
the default date, which determines the dates of my trading time periods for each issuance. 
For each of the deliverable obligations added from CDS auctions, I use the default date for 
its issuer.  
The remaining data is from standard sources – firm fundamental data is from 
Compustat and bid-ask spreads are from Bloomberg Historical Data.  
5.2 Data Description 
The bond data is restricted to bonds that have defaulted between January 1st, 2005 
and August 31, 2018 because Creditfixings began publishing auction settlement data 
beginning in 2005.16 As motivated by Bao and Pan (2013), the bond sample is reduced due 
to the exclusion of all non-regular bonds and Financials, which make up about one-third of 
my dataset. 17 The bond data is further restricted by TRACE’s coverage, which includes 
corporate bond trades for U.S. companies only. Similar to most studies using bond pricing 
14 Par value traded is top-coded at $5 million for investment grade bonds and $1 million for speculative 
grade bonds.  
15 I do not use FISD as in previous literature because of lack of access to the database.  
16 August 31, 2018 being the start date of this research and therefore when the data was downloaded.  
17 Moody’s classifies a regular bond as one with no special features or hybrid characteristics.  
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data from TRACE, such as Bao and Pan (2013), Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando 
(2012), and Helwege et. Al (2009), my sample is also limited because many bonds do not 
trade frequently. Lastly, I drop bonds issued by entities with insufficient information in 
Compustat for firm-level data and bonds that are missing other metrics, such as rating, bid-
ask spread, etc., around the time of default. For my longest time period, from 12 months 
before default to 29 days after default, these restrictions reduce my sample to 609 bonds 
that traded within the time period and 335 bonds that have data for each metric.18 The 
sample size decreases slightly in smaller time periods around default due to some bonds’ 
lack of trading. The smallest sample size is during the time period from default to 29 days 
after default, in which there are 554 bonds that traded and 247 bonds that have data for 
each metric.  
5.3 Return Construction  
I use the transaction-level bond pricing data from TRACE to construct bond return 
volatility for the bonds in my sample. As shown in Table 1, I examine 5 different time 
periods: 12 months before default to 29 days after default (12BDEFA), 12 months before 
default to default (12BDEF), 6 months before default to 29 days after default (6BDEFA), 
6 months before default to default (6BDEF), and default to 29 days after default. Twenty-
nine days after default is chosen because that is the approximate time between default and 
auction for the bonds in my sample.19 
                                                          
18 TRACE and Compustat differ on many entity CUSIPs. As such, most Compustat identification keys are 
determined manually (by looking up the name) for each entity. There are several entities that Compustat 
does not contain, and thus these are either omitted or included under their parent organization, where 
applicable. 
19 I determine this number by calculating the mean and median for time from default to auction for firms in 
my sample, while eliminating outliers.  
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First, I construct daily bond returns as follows. For a bond on day 𝑡𝑡, I take all trades 
from that day and calculate the clean price for the day as the transaction size-weighted 
average price of these trades. By transaction-size weighting prices, I minimize the effect 
of bid-ask spreads in prices.20  Returns are then constructed as: 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1+𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1� 
(1) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the transaction size-weighted average clean price, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 is the accrued interest, 
and 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 is the coupon paid on day 𝑡𝑡. This method of calculating bond returns is motivated 
by Bao and Pan (2013), but I calculate daily returns rather than monthly returns because of 
my narrow time periods and the large and rapid price moves of bonds around default.21 
Coupon rates and maturities are determined by DRD and Bloomberg. Accrued interest is 
calculated daily using the standard 30/360 convention, where applicable. Given the 
riskiness of many of the bonds in my sample and the nature of trading around default, it is 
unsurprising that there are days in the time periods that some bonds do not trade. I treat 
bond returns as independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). This allows me to create 
20 Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) advocate calculating prices as the transaction-size 
weighted average of prices to minimize the effects of bid-ask spreads in prices. Edwards, Harris, and 
Piwowar (2007) and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) show that these effects are greatest for small trades. I 
calculate transaction-size weighted clean prices by weighting each trade’s clean price by its volume and 
taking a daily average of all trades.  
21 Bao and Pan (2013) calculate monthly returns using a transaction-size weighed average of all trades from 
the 21st of the month or later. This allows for a balance between prices that reflect month-end prices and a 
reasonable number of trades to calculate average prices. 
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standardized daily returns, even if there are several days between trades in a given time 
period.22 I then calculate the volatility of daily returns for each time period and annualize. 
5.4 Bond Illiquidity Proxy Construction  
At the bond level, I construct a series of illiquidity variables. Dick-Nielsen, 
Feldhutter, and Lando (2012) note that there is no clear consensus on how to assess the 
illiquidity of an asset, and so I analyze a number of illiquidity-related measures for 
corporate bonds according to the previous literature.23 First, I include age and amount 
outstanding of a bond as motivated by Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst (2005).24  Following 
Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), I collect bid-ask quotes from Bloomberg, but pull daily 
quotes rather than quarterly because I use daily returns to calculate volatility.25 For each 
day, I calculate the daily spread as: 
𝐵𝐵/𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆
        , 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆2  
Because there are not always bid-ask quotes every day, I take the monthly average in order 
to include as many bonds as possible. I define the B/A Spread for each time period as the 
mean monthly average over the time period. Following Bao and Pan (2013), I introduce 
                                                          
22 By assuming i.i.d., I can calculate the return between trades (“trade to trade return”) when there are 
several nontrading days between trades. I divide the trade to trade return by the number of days between 
trades to determine the standardized daily return.  
23 See Bao and Pan (2013), Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012), Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst 
(2005), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) for discussion. Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) also note the 
tradeoffs to using each measure while employing each measure to determine the relation between corporate 
bond yield spreads and liquidity. This both increases robustness and illustrates the comparative power of 
each metric.  
24 See Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst (2005) for further discussion.  
25 The bid-ask quotes from Bloomberg are the Bloomberg Generic Quote, which reflects the consensus 
quote among market participants.  
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the standard deviation of the bid-ask spread to account for the possibility of changing 
illiquidity during the time periods. 
As in Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012), I include bond zero, calculated 
as the percentage of days in the time period for which the bond did not trade.26 I also 
include the four core illiquidity metrics used in Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando 
(2012): the Amihud illiquidity measure, the volatility of the Amihud measure, the Implied 
Round Trip Cost (IRC), and the volatility of the IRC. All four measures are calculated 
using the TRACE bond pricing data. The Amihud (2002) measure, defined as the price 
impact of a trade per unit traded, calculates the price impact of trades. The measure is 
constructed as the daily average of absolute returns 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 divided by the trade size 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 of 
consecutive transactions: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑁𝑁� 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗=1
= 1
𝑁𝑁
�
|𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗−1𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗−1 |
𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗
,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗=1
 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 is the number of returns on day 𝑡𝑡.27 I then define the Amihud measure as the 
mean of daily measures for each time period and include the standard deviation measured 
over the time period as the volatility of the Amihud measure. The IRC is a proxy for bid-
ask spreads, hinged on finding two or three trades very close in time that are likely a result 
of a dealer matching a buyer and a seller and taking the bid-ask spread as a fee.  If there 
are two or three trades of the same size on a bond on the same day and no other trades of 
                                                          
26 Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012) refer to this measure as bond zero-trading days. 
27 In Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012), at least two consecutive transactions on a given day are 
required to construct the Amihud measure. In order to include as many bonds as possible because there are 
several days that bonds do not trade, I loop to the previous trade and divide by the days between, as in my 
return construction, to calculate the average daily Amihud rather than using only consecutive trades on the 
same day. 
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the same size occur on that day, I consider the trades as part of an Imputed Roundtrip Trade 
(IRT). I then calculate the IRC as: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 =  𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  −  𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
, 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the largest price in the IRT and 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the smallest price. Since the IRC 
could depend on trade size, I construct daily IRC values as the average roundtrip costs for 
all trade sizes on that day. I define the IRC as the mean of daily measures for each time 
period and introduce the standard deviation measured over the time period as the volatility 
of the IRC.28 
5.5 Firm Fundamentals Construction  
At the firm level, I construct a series of variables as proxies for firm fundamentals. 
I include EBIT/Assets, Sales/Assets, and Retained Earnings (RE)/Assets due to their 
inclusion in the Altman (1968) Z-Score as metrics to predict bankruptcy. This is 
particularly important since my dataset consists of defaulted firms at risk for bankruptcy. I 
introduce a leverage ratio, defined as Total Debt/Assets, to reflect the credit risk of the firm 
and the Coverage Ratio to measure the ability of a firm to pay interest expenses with 
earnings (Blume, Lim, and MacKinley (1998)).29 I also include Net Income/Assets and 
log(Assets), as motivated by the logit default predication model in Campbell, Hilscher, and 
Szilagyi (2008) and the tendency for firms with CDS to be larger in size (Subrahmanyam, 
                                                          
28 It is likely investors are concerned with future bond liquidity levels as well as the current level. The 
volatility of the Amihud measure and IRC thus may affect liquidity spreads and bond return volatility as 
noted in Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012).  
29 I define Coverage Ratio as operating income after depreciation plus interest and related expense divided 
by interest and related expense.  
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Tang, Wang (2014), Batta and Yu (2017)). These level firm fundamentals are calculated 
from Compustat at dates closest to but not less than 30 days before each firm’s default.  
In addition to these level variables, I include four variables to account for the 
volatility of firm fundamentals. I calculate the volatility of Cash Flow/Assets following 
Minton and Schrand (1999) and volatility of Earnings/Assets following Jayaraman (2008). 
I also include the leverage (Total Debt/Assets) volatility, as motivated by Collin-Dufresne 
and Goldstein (2001), and sales (Sales/Assets) volatility, as motivated by Sufi (2009). I 
construct all of these firm fundamental volatility variables using quarterly Compustat data 
for the five years prior to each firm’s default. The inclusion of RE/Assets, EBIT/Assets, 
leverage, log(Assets), and these other firm fundamental proxies is further motivated by 
their influence on the propensity of a firm to have CDS trading and therefore a CDS auction 
(Subrahmanyam, Tang, Wang (2014)). These variables may also reflect a firms’ credit risk 
and thus market participants’ demand for CDS to hedge (Batta and Yu (2017)). 
5.6 Sample Description 
Table 2 summarizes the corporate bonds in my sample for the largest most 
comprehensive time period, 12BDEFA. The summary statistics for the remaining time 
periods are shown in the Appendix in Tables A1-A4. As shown in Table 2, 12BDEFA 
includes 609 bonds, largely reduced due to the limitations as explained in Section 4. There 
are 373 bonds not in CDS auction and 236 bonds that are in CDS auction, thus 38.8% of 
bonds in my sample are in CDS auction.  
As shown in Panel A, the sample has an average amount outstanding of $400 
million. Neither the average amount outstanding nor the average rating differ significantly 
between Panel B, bonds not in CDS auction, and Panel C, bonds in CDS auction. The 
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average rating is 17.15 (17 = Caa1) and the average age is 5.84 years. Bonds in CDS auction 
are both notably older and have a longer time until maturity than bonds not in CDS auction, 
with an average age of 7.28 years vs. 4.96 years and an average time until maturity of 5.275 
years vs. 6.351 years. There is also a larger average amount of trading on bonds in CDS 
auction than those that are not, both by number of trades (2,309 vs. 1,692) and volume 
traded (803.5 million vs. 507.5 million). Furthermore, bonds in CDS auction have higher 
Amihud and IRC measures than bonds not in CDS auction, with values of 0.00894 and 
0.00572 for the Amihud measure and 2.139 and 1.625 for the IRC measure. The same 
relationship is true for the standard deviation of these variables. The B/A Spread is slightly 
lower for bonds in CDS auction than bonds not in CDS auction (3.012 vs. 3.138). These 
differences suggest that, although bonds in CDS auction have a higher number of trades 
and volume of trading, bonds in CDS auction may be less illiquid than bonds not in CDS 
auction.  
Table 2 also shows that, with the exception of Sales/Assets, the average firm-level 
fundamental ratios are negative. This is intuitive given that these firms are about to enter 
default when these metrics are calculated. However, these ratios are either less negative or 
positive for bonds not in CDS auction. For bonds in CDS auction, these ratios are more 
negative, suggesting that firms with bonds in CDS auctions may be in greater financial 
distress. This result is intuitive since riskier firms are more likely both to be in greater 
financial distress and to have bonds outstanding with CDS written on them and therefore a 
CDS auction. 
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The remainder of this paper formally analyzes the aforementioned patterns by 
examining the effect of CDS auction on bond return volatility while controlling for bond 
characteristics, illiquidity, and firm fundamentals.  
 
6. Methodology 
To investigate bond price manipulation around default, I examine the effect of 
bonds’ inclusion in CDS auctions on bond return volatility for time periods around default. 
I begin with the following baseline regression specification: 
σ𝑚𝑚 = 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽1′𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽2′𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽3′𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚                          (2)              
where σ𝑚𝑚 represents the bond return volatility for bond 𝐵𝐵. The variable of interest, 
𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚, equals one if the bond is a deliverable obligation in an entity’s CDS auction 
and zero otherwise. Among the included control variables, 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 denotes bond-level controls 
that are not included in illiquidity (Moody’s rating, and time to maturity), 𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚 bond-level 
illiquidity control variables (age, amount outstanding, B/A spread, standard deviation of 
B/A spread, bond zero, Amihud, standard deviation of Amhiud, IRC, and standard 
deviation of IRC), 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 firm-level fundamental control variables (EBIT/Assets, Coverage 
Ratio, Sales/Assets, RE/Assets, NI/Assets, leverage, log(Assets), cash flow volatility, 
earning volatility, sales volatility, and leverage volatility), and 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 the residual term.  
Under the assumption that CDS auction is exogenous to the dependent variable, 𝜎𝜎, 
the projection coefficient 𝛾𝛾, identifies the treatment effect, without any control variables. 
However, if having CDS auction is endogenous, 𝛾𝛾 cannot be identified. Since random 
assignment of a CDS auction is likely implausible, I include a large number of control 
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variables related to firm fundamentals, bond-level metrics, bond illiquidity, and CDS 
auction propensity. The identifying assumption underlying my empirical strategy is that 
CDS auctions are randomly assigned, conditional on my controls. Any unobserved factors 
that influence both CDS auction assignment and bond volatility will bias my estimates of 
the treatment effect. I calculate both heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and clustered 
standard errors by distinct default event.  
First, I examine the relation between bond return volatility, the CDS auction 
indicator, and variables that proxy for bond-level controls, firm-level fundamentals, and 
bond illiquidity around the time of default, using the baseline regression shown in Equation 
2. I look at five time periods, defined in Table 1, to determine whether the significance and 
impact of certain variables change in differing time periods around default, namely, in a 
longer/shorter time period before default and the time period after default. If bond price 
manipulation, indirectly represented by bond return volatility, is present around the time of 
default, the 𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚 variable of interest should be significant and positive, based on 
the assumption that manipulated bonds and derivatives experience greater bond trading and 
price volatility around the time of default as market participants attempt to move prices 
favorably for more profitable auction outcomes. 
 Second, to demonstrate the robustness of my treatment effect estimate, I use 
propensity score matching (PSM) to identify control bonds not included in CDS auction 
that have a similar likelihood of “treatment,” or inclusion in CDS auction, as CDS auction 
bonds do. The matched sample is then used to run the same baseline regression. This 
requires the same identification assumption as the baseline regression model above - 
random assignment of CDS auctions, conditional on my covariates. This assumption 
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implies random assignment of CDS auctions, conditional on the probability of treatment, 
where the probability of treatment is determined by my covariates. A key advantage of 
PSM is that it avoids functional form specification for treatment, and thus does not depend 
on an evident source of exogenous variation for identification.30 It can therefore be used to 
reduce or eliminate the effects of confounding when estimating treatment effects. Further, 
by creating a matched sample, PSM addresses the differences between the CDS auction 
sample and the non-CDS auction sample that may not be properly or fully controlled for 
with a linear specification, provided the potential outcome is independent of treatment, 
conditional on the propensity score that is determined by my covariates. Further, another 
key advantage of PSM is that, assuming CIA, it can estimate treatment effects, particularly 
the ATE, while regression estimates the weighted ATE (WATE), where weighting is by 
the variance of treatment.  
 Then, I implement double-robust estimators, which combine the outcome volatility 
regression with a model for the treatment to estimate the causal effect of a treatment on an 
outcome. In this paper, the treatment is a bond’s inclusion in CDS auction and the outcome 
is bond return volatility. Bang and Robins (2005), Robins, Rotnitzky, and Zhao (1994), 
and Robins (2005) introduced these estimators as unbiased estimates of the treatment effect 
when only one or both of these models are correctly specified, while still assuming there 
are no unmeasured confounders. However, prior simulations have proven that the double-
robust estimator is unbiased if a confounder is omitted from one, but not both, of the 
component models (Robins (2005), Davidian (2004)). Funk (2008) confirms this and 
                                                          
30 See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984), Austin and Mamdani (2006), Imbens 
(2004), Subrahmanyam, Tang, Wang (2014) for further discussion on propensity score methods.  
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expands its validity to when one of the two models has been misspecified by categorizing 
a continuous confounder.  
 Lastly, I run my baseline regression (Equation 2) with time fixed-effects, first with 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and then with standard errors clustered by distinct 
default event. I examine time fixed-effects using both quarterly time periods (year-
quarters) and yearly time periods (years). CDS auction defaults could tend to occur during 
periods of high market volatility. If so, some of the volatility effects attributed to CDS 
auction in the baseline regression should be attributed to higher market volatility. Running 
the baseline regression with time fixed-effects controls for any time-varying cross-
sectionally-invariant variations in bond return volatility that are potentially omitted from 
my baseline regression. However, it also could be that CDS auction defaults tend to happen 
during periods of high market volatility because market participants’ battling for favorable 
positions and CDS auction outcomes around the time of default increases market volatility. 
In addition, all the bonds in my sample are defaulted bonds or CDS auction bonds, so there 
is still the control in my first baseline regression that all bonds are analyzed at a similar 
moment in time, respectively, the time of each bond’s default.  
 
7. Empirical Results  
7.1 Baseline Regressions  
I begin my analysis of bond return volatility, which represents indirect evidence of 
bond price manipulation, around default using the cross-sectional volatility regression 
setup shown in Equation 1 for different time periods, as outlined in Section 6. I regress 
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bond return volatility on my variable of interest, CDS Auction, and proxies for firm 
fundamentals and illiquidity as well as the volatility of fundamentals and illiquidity. The 
results are presented in Tables 4-9. Rating and time until maturity are included as bond-
level controls for all specifications.   
As shown in Table 2, the sample of DEFA consisted of fewer bonds and a lower 
average number of trades. Because of the smaller sample size of DEFA, I also look at time 
periods of post-default combined with pre-default (12BDEFA and 6BEFA) to jointly 
analyze bond return volatility before and after default. Further, except for the specification 
9, I omit the controls that are highly correlated with another variable in the regression.31 
The correlation matrix of these variables are shown in Table 3. The omitted controls are 
the standard deviations of the B/A Spread, Amihud, IRC, and leverage because they are 
highly correlated with the B/A Spread, Amihud, IRC, and leverage, respectively, and Net 
Income/Assets and Coverage Ratio, because they are both highly correlated with 
EBIT/Assets.  
Across nearly all specifications for all time periods, I find evidence of a positive 
relation between bond return volatility and CDS auction at the 10 percent significance 
level. In some specifications for certain time periods, I find significance at the 1 percent 
level. In specification 10, in which I two-way cluster standard errors by distinct default 
event, CDS auction is not significant at the 10 percent level. However, there is a “small 
sample problem” that arises when clustering with small and narrowly defined samples like 
my dataset. Further, under my identification assumption that CDS auction is randomly 
31 High correlation is defined as greater than 0.75 in this paper. 
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assigned, conditional on my controls, clustering is not necessary. Thus, it is unsurprising 
that I lose some significance of my CDS auction coefficient and most other variables.32 
Nonetheless, the coefficient on CDS auction is always positive and generally significant at 
conventional levels and varies from 0.249 to 1.357 across specifications and time periods. 
Bond return volatility around default is therefore likely much higher as a result of a bond’s 
inclusion in a CDS auction. The average annual bond return volatility across all bonds 
around the time of default is 99.6% to 139.8% and a bond that is included in a CDS auction 
is associated with greater bond return volatility of 24.9 to 135.7 percentage points around 
default than a bond not included in a CDS auction. While this is a wide range, the range is 
unsurprising given firms’ financial distress, market participants’ erratic trading, and 
possible manipulation of bond prices around the time of default.  
Looking at other variables in the regressions, bond zero is significantly positively 
related to volatility in all specifications at the 1 percent significance level except in 
specification 10 and time period DEFA. This suggests that the fewer the days that a bond 
trades in a time period, the greater the bond return volatility. Consistent with previous 
literature on bond return volatility and illiquidity (Bao and Pan (2013)), the IRC is 
significantly positively related to volatility in nearly every specification and time period, 
and the Amihud is as well in time periods 12BDEFA, 12BDEF, and DEFA. However, the 
B/A Spread is positively related to volatility with statistical significance in limited 
specifications and time periods. It is reasonable to expect a positive significant relationship 
                                                          
32 See Bakirov and Székely (2005), Ibragimov and Müller (2010), Imbens and Kolesar (2016), Ibragimov 
and Müller (2016), Abadie et. Al (2017) for discussion of small sample problem and clustering 
methodology.  
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between illiquidity measures and bond return volatility around the time of default since 
previous literature demonstrates that corporate bonds’ yield spreads are related to proxies 
for illiquidity.33 
Firm fundamentals, on the other hand, are seldom statistically significantly related to 
volatility. However, RE/Assets and Sales/Assets are significantly negatively related to 
volatility in many specifications and time periods. It follows that greater earnings and sales 
might decrease risk and therefore decrease bond return volatility. Further, cash flow 
volatility is statistically significant in time period DEFA, suggesting that having a 
historically higher cash flow volatility might increase bond return volatility after default. 
Lastly, unlike in Bao and Pan (2013), in most specifications and time periods, rating is 
insignificantly related to volatility, except in time period DEFA. This suggests that the 
rating of the bond has a greater impact on bond return volatility after default than before 
default. The poorer the rating, the greater the bond return volatility, which is intuitive since 
a bond with a lower rating is riskier and thus more likely to experience greater bond return 
volatility after default as market participants may strive for favorable auction pricing and/or 
default outcome. It could also be that the poorer the rating the more uncertainty there is 
regarding the default outcome and possible default resolution. Lastly, time until maturity 
is significantly negatively related to volatility.  
I now focus on specification 8 across time periods, presented in Table 4. In this 
specification, I omit the controls that are highly correlated with another variable in the 
regression, but include all other controls and my variable of interest. CDS auction is 
33 See Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando 
(2012), and Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2012) among others. 
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statistically significant across all time periods. A bond that is included in a CDS auction is 
associated with a greater annual volatility of 31.2 to 63.8 percentage points. The coefficient 
on CDS auction is smallest for time period 12BDEF, and is greater for 12BDEFA when 
the post default time period is included. However, time period 6BDEF has the highest 
coefficient, higher than both time period 6BDEFA and DEFA. This suggests that there is 
greater bond return volatility for bonds included in a CDS auction in the six months before 
default than in the twelve months before default or in the post default time period. This 
indirectly supports the hypothesis that there is bond price manipulation for these CDS 
auction bonds around the time of default as market participants try to build up a favorable 
position prior to default, particularly in the 6 months prior. This manipulation is then 
continued, but possibly less intensely, after default due to the auction design and battle 
between market participants for favorable pricing during the auction settlement process. 
 Furthermore, Table 4 shows that illiquidity measures are of greater statistical 
significance than are firm fundamentals across time periods. However, there are more 
statistically significant illiquidity variables for 12BDEFA and 12BDEF than 6BEFA and 
6BDEF. It could be that ordinarily these variables are significantly positively related to 
volatility. But when a company is on the verge of default and market participants may be 
trying to build favorable positions prior to an anticipated default, these illiquidity variables 
are of weaker significance and whether the bond will be included in a CDS auction is more 
significant and has a greater impact on volatility.  
 Surprisingly and unlike in previous literature, time until maturity is negatively 
related to volatility. This relation suggests that, around the time of default, bonds with 
greater time until maturity experience less price volatility. Time until maturity is 
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statistically significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent levels in all time periods except for 
after default. In the post-default period, CDS Auction, Rating, B/A Spread, Amihud, IRC, 
and cash flow volatility are significantly positively related to volatility. These factors differ 
slightly from the significant factors in pre-default time periods. This result could be 
because of the small sample size and the short length of this time period or because different 
factors influence bond return volatility after default as a result of the auction design, battle 
among market participants for favorable pricing if there is an auction, and/or issuers and 
market participants’ attempts to create the most advantageous default outcomes.   
Overall, the baseline regressions clearly demonstrate the positive significance of 
CDS auction on bond return volatility around the time of default, as well as the positive 
relation between illiquidity measures and bond return volatility. This positive significance 
provides indirect evidence of bond price manipulation around default for bonds that are in 
CDS auction.  
7.2 Propensity Score Matching 
In this subsection, I repeat the previous baseline regressions (specification 8) using 
propensity score matched samples. The propensity scores are calculated with a probit 
model of CDS auction, as shown in Table 10. I use several of the variables included by 
Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2013) and add additional 
firm fundamental level and volatility variables. As in the baseline regressions, I exclude 
firm fundamentals that are highly correlated, namely Coverage Ratio, Net Income/Assets, 
and leverage volatility. I use two different matching criteria: (1) nearest neighbor, in which 
one non-CDS auction bond with the nearest propensity score is matched to each CDS 
auction bond and (2) three nearest neighbors, in which three non-CDS auction bonds with 
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the closest propensity scores are matched to each CDS auction bond.34 As the summary 
statistics in Table 2 demonstrate, CDS auction bonds and non-CDS auction bonds can be 
quite different in terms of age, illiquidity measures, and several firm fundamentals. The 
goal of PSM is to create a matched sample in which these differences are removed to be 
able to isolate the treatment effect of CDS auction.  
Table 11 shows the average predictive effect on the treated and average predictive 
effect of CDS auction on bond return volatility using PSM, which can be interpreted as the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET or ATT) and average treatment effect (ATE), 
respectively, under my identification assumption. The ATET measures the expected causal 
effect of the treatment for those bonds in the treatment group, whereas the ATE measures 
the expected causal effect of the treatment across all bonds. The ATET and ATE are 
positive and significant at the 1 or 5 percent level across all time periods and matching 
criteria. More specifically, the estimated ATET of CDS auction on bond return volatility 
indicates that, depending on the time period around default, the average bond return 
volatility for a CDS auction bond is 75.4 to 157.5 percentage points higher than if it is not 
in a CDS auction. Further, the ATE of CDS auction on bond return volatility estimates that 
the bond return volatility around the time of default is 63.7 to 191.1 percentage points 
higher when a bond is included in a CDS auction. The ATET and ATE differ in magnitude 
slightly, which suggests that the treatment assignment, or whether a bond will be in a CDS 
auction, may not be random.  
                                                          
34 Following Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2013) and Batta and Yu (2017) I use nearest neighbor 
matching. As in Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2013), I use nearest neighbor k matching but let k = 3 
rather than 2.  
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To control for the possibility that treatment assignment may not be random and the 
potential lingering imbalances between groups, I replicate the analysis performed in Table 
4 (Section 7.1) pertaining to the effect of CDS auction on bond return volatility around 
default. As shown in Table 12, CDS auction remains significantly positively related to 
bond return volatility in most time periods and matching criteria. In fact, with the exception 
of the time period DEFA, the CDS auction coefficients are mostly greater in magnitude 
and of greater significance than in Section 7.1.35 With the matched sample, a bond that is 
included in a CDS auction is associated with a greater annual volatility of 26.2 to 114.0 
percentage points. Consistent with Section 7.1 and Table 4, the coefficients on the 6 month 
before default time periods are the greatest, further supporting that there may be greater 
bond return volatility for bonds included in CDS auction in the 6 months before default 
than in the 12 months before default or in the time period after default. However, CDS 
auction is no longer significant for nearest neighbor and three nearest neighbors matching 
for the DEFA time period. This could be due to the lack of observations in the post default 
time period or inferior matching as a result of the short length of the time period, financial 
distress of the firm, and/or illiquidity of the bonds after default. Further, it could be that 
different factors influence bond return volatility after default due to the CDS auction design 
or the battle among issuers and investors for advantageous auction pricing or default 
outcomes.  
As shown in Table 12, many of the control variables that are significant in the 
baseline regressions remain significant and of the same relative magnitude. However, 
                                                          
35 6BDEFA NN(3) is also an exception in which the CDS auction coefficient is smaller in magnitude and of 
less significance, but this may be due to the three nearest neighbor matching method because the coefficient 
in 6BDEFA NN(1) is greater in magnitude and of greater significance than in Section 7.1.  
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several factors are of greater significance and/or magnitude (log(Amt), Age, Amihud, IRC, 
Sales/Assets, RE/Assets) or are now significant (EBIT/Assets, log(Assets)). As in Section 
7.1, illiquidity measures are of greater statistical significance across time periods than firm 
fundamentals. For the time periods 12BDEFA and 12BDEF, firm fundamentals are more 
significant and greater in magnitude than they were in the baseline regressions. This does 
not hold for the six month time periods, suggesting that firm fundamentals influence bond 
return volatility less the closer to default and, given the greater magnitude and significance 
of the CDS auction coefficient, whether a bond may be included in a CDS auction 
influences bond return volatility more.  
Taken together, my previous findings that CDS auction is significantly positively 
related to bond return volatility around the time of default, particularly the six months prior 
to default, and that illiquidity measures are significantly positively related to bond return 
volatility, are robust to using a propensity score matched sample. The coefficient on CDS 
auction is greater in the PSM regressions than in the baseline regressions (0.262 to 1.140 
vs 0.312 to 0.638). Similarly, for the illiquidity measures and few firm fundamentals that 
are significant, the coefficients from using PSM regression are generally higher than those 
from using baseline regression.   
7.3 Double-Robust Estimators   
Given the assumption of PSM that matching is based on observable information, I 
perform another robustness test by implementing double-robust estimators. The double-
robust estimator is unbiased even if a confounder is omitted from one of the component 
models or when one of the models has been misspecified (Robins (2005), Davidian (2004), 
Funk (2008)). This doubly-robust method requires me to specify regression models for the 
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outcome and the treatment as a function of covariates. I use the same baseline regressions 
as in Table 4 and treatment model as in Table 10 (Section 7.2), thus excluding highly 
correlated firm fundamentals in modeling treatment. I use two double-robust estimators 
through augmented inverse-probability weighting (AIPW) and inverse-probability-
weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA), which both model the outcome and the 
treatment to account for the nonrandom treatment assignment.36   
Table 13 shows the effect of CDS auction on bond return volatility using the AIPW 
and IPWRA double-robust estimators. I estimate the potential-outcome means, the ATE, 
and the ATET.37 The average potential outcome for non-CDS auction bonds is always 
lower than the average potential outcome for CDS auction bonds. This difference further 
demonstrates that bonds included in CDS auction are associated with greater price 
volatility around default since the average potential outcome, or price volatility, is greater. 
Further, the ATET of CDS auction on bond return volatility indicates that, depending on 
the time period around default, the average bond return volatility for a CDS auction bond 
is 37.8 to 78.3 percentage points higher than if it is not in a CDS auction.38 Further, the 
ATE of CDS auction on bond return volatility estimates that bond return volatility around 
the time of default is 14.6 to 75.7 percentage points higher when a bond is included in a 
CDS auction. The ATE values are significant for both estimators for 12BDEFA and 
                                                          
36 As defined by Stata, RA estimators model the outcome to account for the nonrandom treatment 
assignment. IPW estimators model the treatment to account for the nonrandom treatment assignment. 
IPWRA uses IPW weights to estimate corrected regression coefficients that are then used to perform 
regression adjustment. The AIPW estimator adds a bias-correction term to the IPW estimator. If the 
treatment model is specified correctly, the bias-correction term is 0 and the model is reduced to the IPW 
estimator. If the treatment model is misspecified but the outcome model is specified correctly, the bias-
correction term corrects the estimator. Both estimators are double-robust.  
https://blog.stata.com/2015/07/07/introduction-to-treatment-effects-in-stata-part-1/ 
37 The potential-outcome mean is the average potential outcome for that treatment level.  
38 The ATET cannot be measured using the AIPW double-robust estimators.  
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12BDEF time periods and the AIPW estimator for 6BDEFA and 6BDEF time periods. 
These ATE values using double-robust estimators are smaller in magnitude than using 
propensity score matching as in Table 11.  
However, these estimators have the double-robust property, which means that the 
estimates of the effects will still be consistent if the outcome or treatment model are 
misspecified or a confounder is omitted in one of the treatment models. Thus, the estimates 
suggest that CDS auction significantly positively impacts bond return volatility in the time 
periods twelve months and six months before default and when combined with the post 
default time period. As in Section 7.2, the double-robust estimators do not show CDS 
auction is significant for the time period DEFA. Therefore, my previous findings of the 
positive significance of CDS auction on bond return volatility for multiple time periods 
around default persist when using double-robust estimators. This positive significance 
when using double-robust estimators provides further indirect evidence of bond price 
manipulation around default for bonds that are in CDS auction. 
7.4 Time Fixed-Effects  
 Because CDS auction bonds could have the tendency to default during high market 
volatility times, I first investigate the time distribution of default for CDS auction and non-
CDS auction bonds. As shown in Figure 1, there does not seem to be a strong difference in 
the time distribution of default. However, I still run my baseline regressions (specification 
8) with the addition of time fixed-effects by year-quarters and years to control for any time-
varying cross-sectionally-invariant variations in bond return volatility that are potentially 
omitted from my baseline regression.  
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As shown in Table 14, the inferences in Section 7.1 are unchanged by the inclusion 
of time fixed-effects. The coefficients are of similar magnitude, although each coefficient 
is common to all year-quarters or years for the variable, respectively. Unlike in Section 7.1, 
the CDS auction coefficient for time period BDEFA with year-quarters time fixed-effects 
is significant at the 1 percent level and greater in magnitude (0.822 vs 0.383).39 This 
suggests bonds in CDS auction experience significantly greater bond return volatility from 
time of default to auction, common to all year-quarters. As shown in Table 15, in which 
standard errors are clustered by distinct default event, the CDS auction coefficient for time 
period BDEF is also positively significantly related to bond return volatility, although 
slightly less significant. This relationship indicates indirect evidence of market participants 
manipulating bond prices after default leading up to CDS auction to achieve favorable 
positions and profitable CDS auction outcomes.   
  Table 15 also shows, however, that when using standard errors clustered by distinct 
default event, many of the CDS auction coefficients that were previously significant are no 
longer significant at the 10 percent level. Several other variables, such as Maturity, 
log(Amt), etc., are also no longer significant at the 10 percent level or are of less 
significance than they were in Section 7.1. The Amihud and IRC measures are still strongly 
significant in most time periods, further supporting the positive relationship between 
illiquidity measures and bond return volatility at the time of default.  
Ultimately, by running time fixed-effects regressions, I am able to control for 
market-level variation that is not accounted for by my controls, although any omitted 
                                                          
39 Although the coefficients in the time-fixed effects regressions represent the effect of CDS auction on 
bond return volatility within a given year. Or, put another way, the (weighted) average of the treatment 
effects that would be estimated if the regressions were ran separately each year.  
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factors that affect my cross-section of bonds differently are still threats to my identification 
of a treatment effect. I find CDS auction is positively significantly related to bond return 
volatility with time-fixed effects (Table 14), and positively related to bond return volatility 
with time-fixed effects and standard errors clustered by distinct default event (Table 15). 
The decreased statistical significance of CDS auction and other controls with standard 
errors clustered by distinct default event is likely due to my small dataset (as discussed in 
Section 7.1), and under my identification assumption clustering may not be necessary.40  
 
8. Conclusion  
 In this paper, I investigate manufactured credit events and market participants’ 
attempts to favorably move the prices of bonds included in CDS auction to gain more 
profitable positions around default and emerging from CDS auctions. There is no previous 
empirical research on evidence of these practices because of the limited data and small 
number of revealed cases. However, these cases are becoming more common, with three 
public cases in the past twelve months, and are not necessarily fair market activity. The 
CFTC has stated that these credit events may constitute market manipulation and casual 
empiricism suggests the ramifications of these events and bond price manipulation could 
undermine not only the CDS market but the entire credit derivatives market.  In early 2019, 
the ISDA made a proposal to decrease these credit events, specifically “narrowly tailored 
credit events.” While this proposal is an attempt to prevent additional events, the proposal 
                                                          
40 See Bakirov and Székely (2005), Ibragimov and Müller (2010), Imbens and Kolesar (2016), Ibragimov 
and Müller (2016), Abadie et. Al (2017) for discussion of small sample problem and clustering 
methodology.  
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is very narrow and would only prevent a very certain type of credit event, not all forms of 
manipulation.41  
To investigate manufactured credit events and this bond price manipulation before 
CDS auctions, I analyze bond return volatility around the time of default for bonds that are 
included in CDS auctions, either because they have CDS written on them or their reference 
entity does, compared to their counterparts not in CDS auctions. I use bond return volatility 
as a measure of indirect evidence of market participants manipulating bond prices before 
default and from default to auction as market participants try to favorably move prices to 
achieve more profitable CDS auction outcomes.  
Using defaulted bonds over the 2005-2018 time period with pricing data in TRACE 
and sufficient data to measure bond illiquidity, firm fundamentals, and bond 
characteristics, I find a bond’s inclusion in a CDS auction is significantly positively related 
to bond return volatility around the time of default. First, I run baseline regressions in which 
I control for bond illiquidity, credit risk, firm fundamentals, and other bond-level controls 
and find that a bond included in a CDS auction is associated with a higher bond return 
volatility around default, particularly in the six months prior to default. Several bond 
illiquidity measures are also significantly positively related to bond return volatility around 
the time of default.  
As a robustness test, I use propensity score matching to create datasets of CDS 
auction bonds and control bonds that have a similar likelihood of being included in a CDS 
auction for each time period. The ATET and ATE of these propensity score matched 
41 Smith, Robert, 2019, “Isda’s whack-a-mole fixes for credit default swaps merit scrutiny,” Financial 
Times, Mar 7.  
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samples are positive and significant for all time periods and matching specifications. 
Further, CDS auction and bond illiquidity measures’ significantly positive effect on bond 
return volatility around default in the baseline regressions remain robust to using 
propensity score matched samples. The significantly positive treatment effect of a bond’s 
inclusion in CDS auction on bond return volatility for the time periods twelve and six 
months before default and when combined with the post default time period also persists 
when using double-robust estimators. Lastly, to control for the possible tendency of CDS 
auction bond defaults to occur during high market volatility times and for any market-wide 
variation in bond return volatility that is unexplained by my controls, I run my baseline 
regressions with time fixed-effects. I find that CDS auction and illiquidity measures are 
significantly positively related to bond return volatility with time fixed-effects and 
positively related to bond return volatility with time fixed effects and standard errors 
clustered by distinct default event.  
Therefore, given that bonds included in CDS auctions are associated with higher 
bond return volatility around the time of default, I find indirect evidence of bond price 
manipulation around the time of default for bonds included in CDS auctions compared to 
their counterparts not in CDS auctions. This paper is thus the first to find empirical 
indication of market participants manipulating bond prices prior to CDS auctions as they 
strive for more profitable positions and auction outcomes and possibly of manufactured 
credit events that are not necessarily already publicized in the news. This paper is also the 
first to model factors influencing bond return volatility around the time of default and finds 
strong evidence that bond illiquidity is significantly positively related to bond return 
volatility around the time of default. To continue this analysis and investigation, the dataset 
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could be expanded to include defaulted bonds not only included in TRACE or Compustat 
(by gathering data from other sources). This would further strengthen the results given the 
small size of my sample. As an extension of this paper, further research could examine the 
impact of a bond’s inclusion in CDS auction on excess bond return volatility using a 
Merton model with stochastic interest rates and equity volatility as in Bao and Pan (2013). 
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9. Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1: Time Period Names and Descriptions 
Name Description 
12BDEFA 12 months before default to 29 days after 
default 
12BDEF 12 months before default to default 
6BDEFA 6 months before default to 29 days after 
default 
6BDEF 6 months before default to default  
DEFA Default to 29 days after default  
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 12BDEFA 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
All Bonds Bonds Not in CDS 
Auction 
Bonds in CDS Auction 
VARIABLES N mean std mean std mean std 
        
Number of 
Trades 
609 1,931 2,975 1,692 2,857 2,309 3,122 
Volume Traded 609 622.2 911.9 507.5 731.2 803.5 111.9 
Daily Return 599 -0.590 3.25 -0.252 1.15 -1.11 4.95 
Annual 
Volatility 
594 112.4 171.8 90.0 92.4 147.1 244.8 
Rating  498 17.15 2.087 17.12 2.025 17.21 2.232 
Age 602 5.847 4.701 4.965 3.722 7.285 5.684 
Maturity 602 5.684 6.749 5.275 7.328 6.351 5.635 
IRC 605 1.825 1.387 1.625 1.250 2.139 1.528 
Bond Zero 609 54.32 30.72 54.51 32.77 54.02 27.25 
Amihud 608 0.00697 0.0155 0.00572 0.00647 0.00894 0.0234 
SD(IRC) 600 2.810 2.924 2.464 2.720 3.358 3.150 
SD(Amihud) 603 0.0164 0.0332 0.0159 0.0390 0.0173 0.0211 
B/A Spread 472 3.089 4.751 3.138 5.150 3.012 4.048 
SD(B/A Spread) 456 0.998 1.816 0.932 1.834 1.102 1.787 
Log(Amt) 602 19.81 0.927 19.72 0.824 19.96 1.058 
CDS Auction 609 0.388 0.488 0 0 1 0 
CDS Firm 609 0.798 0.401 0.684 0.464 0.979 0.144 
EBIT/Assets 549 -0.0212 0.108 -0.0211 0.0806 -0.0215 0.141 
Coverage Ratio 555 -0.262 8.178 -0.0603 7.840 -0.584 8.699 
Sales/Assets 549 0.182 0.143 0.191 0.165 0.168 0.0963 
RE/Assets 549 -0.531 0.747 -0.524 0.772 -0.542 0.707 
NI/Assets 549 -0.0700 0.126 -0.0696 0.115 -0.0707 0.141 
54
CF/Assets  549 -0.00591 0.0533 0.00400 0.0501 -0.0218 0.0545 
Earnings/Assets  548 -0.0689 0.124 -0.0694 0.114 -0.0682 0.139 
Leverage 549 0.422 0.846 0.408 0.796 0.446 0.922 
Cash Flow Vol 545 0.0361 0.0266 0.0407 0.0267 0.0288 0.0248 
log(Assets) 549 8.671 1.649 8.125 1.773 9.545 0.893 
Earnings Vol 545 0.0447 0.0459 0.0492 0.0502 0.0376 0.0372 
Sales Vol 545 0.0437 0.0519 0.0516 0.0608 0.0311 0.0289 
Leverage Vol 545 0.159 0.249 0.151 0.230 0.171 0.276 
        
Summary statistics for all bonds in my sample (Panel A), bonds not in CDS auction (Panel B), and bonds in 
CDS auction (Panel C) for time period 12BDEFA. Observations are reported at the bond level. Number of 
trades is the number of trades for a bond in the time period. Volume Traded is a bond’s trading volume in $ 
million face value for the time period. Daily Return is the average of a bond’s daily return over the time 
period reported in % and Annual Volatility is the annualized volatility of a bond’s daily returns reported in 
%. Rating is a numerical translation of Moody’s rating, where 1=Aaa and 21=C. Age is the time since issuance 
in years, and Maturity is a bond’s time to maturity in years, measured at the day of default. Bond Zero, 
Amihud, Amihud Vol, IRC, IRC Vol, B/A Spread, and SD(B/A Spread) are defined and calculated as described 
in Section 5.4. Bond Zero is expressed in percent. log(Amt) is the natural log a bond’s amount outstanding. 
CDS Auction indicates 1 if the bond is included in a CDS auction and 0 otherwise. CDS Firm indicates 1 if 
the bond’s issuing firm has ever issued CDS (on any bond) and 0 otherwise. Using Compustat data, 
EBIT/Assets is defined as OIADP/AT, Coverage Ratio is defined as (OIADP + XINT)/XINT, Sales/Assets is 
defined as SALE/AT, RE/Assets is defined as RE/AT, NI/Assets is defined as NI/AT, CF/Assets is defined as 
OANCF/AT, Earnings/Assets is defined as IB/AT, Leverage is defined as (DLC + DLTT)/AT, and 
log(Assets) is defined as the natural log of total book assets, AT. Cash Flow Vol, Earnings Vol, Sales Vol, 
and Leverage Vol are calculated as described in Section 5.5 using the last five years of Compustat quarterly 
data.  
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Table 4: Baseline Regression across Time Periods 
VARIABLES 12BDEFA 12BDEF 6BDEFA 6BDEF DEFA 
CDS Auction 0.485** 0.312* 0.572* 0.638** 0.383* 
(2.451) (1.964) (1.920) (2.206) (1.694) 
Rating 0.0315 0.0205 0.0620 0.0302 0.0759* 
(0.873) (0.698) (1.141) (0.558) (1.941) 
Maturity -0.0591*** -0.0330** -0.0925*** -0.0732*** -0.0222 
(-3.211) (-2.171) (-3.379) (-2.667) (-1.169) 
Age 0.0147 -0.00751 0.0834** 0.0592 -0.0449
(0.593) (-0.376) (2.196) (1.581) (-1.499)
log(Amt) 0.331** 0.255** 0.381* 0.350* -0.184
(2.411) (2.256) (1.872) (1.700) (-1.250)
B/A Spread 0.0135 0.0219* 0.00885 0.0237 0.0409**
(0.819) (1.654) (0.355) (0.969) (2.145)
Bond Zero 0.0169*** 0.0161*** 0.0153*** 0.0228*** -0.00174
(5.679) (6.255) (3.757) (4.689) (-0.554) 
Amihud 48.01*** 65.37*** -13.20 0.568 40.01*** 
(3.684) (6.514) (-0.629) (0.0286) (4.861) 
IRC 0.551*** 0.385*** 0.681*** 0.472*** 0.269*** 
(7.765) (6.088) (9.554) (5.839) (9.344) 
EBIT/Assets  0.722 -0.0725 3.907* 1.295 0.932 
(0.590) (-0.0724) (1.805) (0.588) (0.502) 
Sales/Assets -1.186* -1.072** -1.786* -1.605 0.708 
(-1.792) (-1.977) (-1.790) (-1.609) (1.023) 
RE/Assets -0.292* -0.289** -0.302 -0.438* 0.120 
(-1.891) (-2.294) (-1.253) (-1.824) (0.681) 
Leverage  -0.133 -0.0692 -0.299** -0.226 0.110 
(-1.383) (-0.878) (-2.025) (-1.532) (1.010) 
log(Assets) -0.0958 -0.0362 -0.182 -0.124 0.148 
(-1.155) (-0.523) (-1.449) (-0.974) (1.605) 
Cash Flow Vol 2.359 0.921 2.497 1.590 13.24*** 
(0.614) (0.295) (0.422) (0.271) (3.028) 
Earnings Vol  -1.163 -1.266 -1.016 -2.138 -0.748
(-0.488) (-0.653) (-0.282) (-0.599) (-0.202)
Sales Vol 0.216 1.498 -0.108 1.389 -3.376
(0.106) (0.901) (-0.0353) (0.459) (-1.575)
Constant -7.260*** -6.051*** -7.863** -7.506* 1.070 
(-2.763) (-2.800) (-2.020) (-1.915) (0.392) 
Observations 335 334 331 330 247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.318 0.321 0.314 0.197 0.447 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This table presents the baseline cross-sectional regression (specification 8) across all time periods. The 
dependent variable is σ𝑚𝑚 , the annualized daily volatility for bond 𝐵𝐵. CDS Auction indicates 1 if the bond is 
included in a CDS auction and 0 otherwise. Rating is a numerical translation of Moody’s rating, where 1=Aaa 
and 21=C. Maturity is a bond’s time to maturity in years, and Age is the time since issuance in years, measured 
57
at the day of default. log(Amt) is the natural log a bond’s amount outstanding. B/A Spread, Bond Zero, 
Amihud, and IRC are defined and calculated as described in Section 5.4. Using Compustat data, EBIT/Assets 
is defined as OIADP/AT, Sales/Assets is defined as SALE/AT, RE/Assets is defined as RE/AT, Leverage is 
defined as (DLC + DLTT)/AT, and log(Assets) is defined as the natural log of total book assets, AT. Cash 
Flow Vol, Earnings Vol, and Sales Vol are calculated as described in Section 5.5 using the last five years of 
Compustat quarterly data. Note: Coefficients are interpreted in the following way. CDS Auction’s 0.485 
coefficient for 12BDEFA means a bond included in a CDS auction is associated with a greater annual 
volatility of 48.5 percentage points. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Time Distribution of CDS Auction vs. Non-CDS Auction Defaults 
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10. Appendix
Table A1: Summary Stats 12BDEF 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
All Bonds Bonds Not in CDS 
Auction 
Bonds in CDS 
Auction 
VARIABLES N mean std mean std mean Std 
Number of Trades 605 1,787 2,756 1,588 2,652 2,104 2,890 
Volume Traded 605 571.6 830.3 481 691.2 715.2 997.5 
Daily Return 593 -0.00672 0.0364 -0.00331 0.0129 -0.0121 0.0558 
Daily Volatility  590 0.0667 0.117 0.0608 0.100 0.0760 0.138 
Annual Volatility 590 0.996 1.564 0.861 0.942 1.206 2.197 
Rating  496 17.16 2.089 17.13 2.028 17.21 2.232 
Bond Zero 605 57.44 28.63 57.37 30.47 57.55 25.51 
Age 600 5.820 4.680 4.915 3.662 7.285 5.684 
Maturity 600 5.670 6.733 5.251 7.305 6.351 5.635 
IRC 601 1.651 1.162 1.580 1.142 1.762 1.188 
Amihud 604 0.00613 0.00670 0.00574 0.00668 0.00675 0.00669 
SD(IRC) 594 2.447 2.433 2.354 2.546 2.596 2.237 
SD(Amihud) 598 0.0156 0.0330 0.0155 0.0399 0.0159 0.0171 
Log(Amt) 600 19.81 0.927 19.72 0.825 19.96 1.058 
CDS Auction 605 0.387 0.487 0 0 1 0 
CDS Firm 605 0.797 0.402 0.682 0.465 0.979 0.145 
EBIT/Assets 545 -0.0212 0.108 -0.0211 0.0808 -0.0213 0.142 
Coverage Ratio 551 -0.259 8.205 -0.0652 7.859 -0.569 8.739 
Sales/Assets 545 0.182 0.143 0.191 0.166 0.167 0.0962 
RE/Assets 545 -0.528 0.747 -0.523 0.773 -0.535 0.706 
NI/Assets 545 -0.0701 0.126 -0.0698 0.116 -0.0707 0.141 
CF/Assets  545 -0.00541 0.0528 0.00423 0.0498 -0.0209 0.0540 
Earnings/Assets  544 -0.0690 0.125 -0.0696 0.114 -0.0681 0.140 
Leverage 545 0.422 0.849 0.408 0.798 0.444 0.926 
Cash Flow Vol 541 0.0361 0.0267 0.0408 0.0268 0.0286 0.0248 
Earnings Vol 541 0.0447 0.0460 0.0493 0.0502 0.0373 0.0373 
Sales Vol 541 0.0434 0.0519 0.0515 0.0609 0.0305 0.0283 
Leverage Vol 541 0.159 0.249 0.151 0.231 0.171 0.277 
log(Assets) 545 8.655 1.642 8.111 1.768 9.528 0.881 
B/A Spread 470 3.084 4.816 3.117 5.193 3.031 4.158 
SD(B/A Spread) 454 0.972 1.834 0.911 1.842 1.067 1.821 
Summary statistics for all bonds in my sample (Panel A), bonds not in CDS auction (Panel B), and bonds in 
CDS auction (Panel C) for time period 12BDEF. Observations are reported at the bond level. All variables 
are defined as in Table 2. 
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Table A2: Summary Stats 6BDEFA 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
All Bonds Bonds Not in CDS 
Auction 
Bonds in CDS Auction 
VARIABLES N mean std mean std mean std 
Number of Trades 592 1,105 1,829 1,002 1,884 1,267 1,732 
Volume Traded 592 363.7 591.5 292 447.1 475.1 751 
Daily Return 583 -0.0138 0.0969 -0.00560 0.0580 -0.0263 0.135 
Daily Volatility  576 0.0961 0.186 0.0782 0.143 0.123 0.234 
Annual Volatility 576 1.398 2.504 1.029 0.995 1.952 3.707 
Rating 490 17.13 2.091 17.10 2.032 17.20 2.227 
Bond Zero 592 56.52 30.81 56.42 32.06 56.67 28.83 
Age 585 5.877 4.734 5.006 3.739 7.270 5.731 
Maturity 585 5.726 6.827 5.281 7.443 6.437 5.647 
IRC 589 2.328 2.129 1.946 1.796 2.920 2.450 
Amihud 592 0.00718 0.0158 0.00606 0.00644 0.00891 0.0238 
SD(IRC) 578 3.197 3.547 2.648 3.125 4.052 3.978 
SD(Amihud) 585 0.0159 0.0228 0.0153 0.0225 0.0169 0.0234 
Log(Amt) 585 19.81 0.917 19.73 0.809 19.95 1.056 
CDS Auction 592 0.392 0.489 0 0 1 0 
CDS Firm 592 0.799 0.400 0.683 0.464 0.978 0.146 
EBIT/Assets 534 -0.0211 0.106 -0.0205 0.0755 -0.0221 0.142 
Coverage Ratio 540 -0.309 8.265 -0.110 7.928 -0.621 8.778 
Sales/Assets 534 0.184 0.144 0.193 0.167 0.170 0.0967 
RE/Assets 534 -0.533 0.751 -0.528 0.776 -0.540 0.712 
NI/Assets 534 -0.0692 0.124 -0.0680 0.112 -0.0710 0.142 
CF/Assets  534 -0.00652 0.0537 0.00332 0.0505 -0.0221 0.0549 
Earnings/Assets  533 -0.0681 0.123 -0.0679 0.111 -0.0685 0.140 
Leverage 534 0.428 0.847 0.412 0.793 0.454 0.929 
Cash Flow Vol 530 0.0365 0.0268 0.0411 0.0270 0.0292 0.0249 
Earnings Vol 530 0.0451 0.0461 0.0497 0.0503 0.0379 0.0375 
Sales Vol 530 0.0442 0.0524 0.0522 0.0616 0.0316 0.0290 
Leverage Vol 530 0.159 0.248 0.153 0.228 0.170 0.278 
log(Assets) 534 8.668 1.636 8.118 1.756 9.537 0.899 
B/A Spread 459 3.135 4.966 3.279 5.501 2.909 3.993 
SD(B/A Spread) 444 1.009 1.868 0.964 1.924 1.078 1.781 
Summary statistics for all bonds in my sample (Panel A), bonds not in CDS auction (Panel B), and bonds in 
CDS auction (Panel C) for time period 6BDEFA. Observations are reported at the bond level. All variables 
are defined as in Table 2. 
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Table A3: Summary Stats BDEF6 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
All Bonds Bonds Not in CDS 
Auction 
Bonds in CDS 
Auction 
VARIABLES N mean std mean std mean std 
Number of Trades 596 939.2 1,573 877.7 1,646 1,035 1,450 
Volume Traded 596 305.7 491.1 259.7 398.6 377.4 603.8 
Daily Return 585 -0.0187 0.139 -0.00677 0.0574 -0.0370 0.208 
Daily Volatility  577 0.0834 0.166 0.0749 0.141 0.0966 0.199 
Annual Volatility 577 1.215 2.159 1.008 1.060 1.533 3.159 
Rating  488 17.13 2.093 17.11 2.035 17.20 2.227 
Bond Zero 596 56.90 28.43 56.27 29.65 57.88 26.45 
Age 591 5.830 4.696 4.920 3.666 7.278 5.696 
Maturity 591 5.709 6.773 5.290 7.376 6.375 5.636 
IRC 591 2.102 1.721 1.921 1.586 2.389 1.883 
Amihud 596 0.00639 0.00724 0.00608 0.00669 0.00688 0.00802 
SD(IRC) 576 2.813 2.982 2.566 2.968 3.210 2.968 
SD(Amihud) 585 0.0149 0.0208 0.0147 0.0213 0.0153 0.0200 
Log(Amt) 591 19.83 0.924 19.74 0.817 19.96 1.060 
CDS Auction 596 0.391 0.488 0 0 1 0 
CDS Firm 596 0.800 0.399 0.686 0.463 0.979 0.145 
EBIT/Assets 538 -0.0206 0.106 -0.0200 0.0752 -0.0215 0.142 
Coverage Ratio 544 -0.280 8.234 -0.0910 7.891 -0.579 8.759 
Sales/Assets 538 0.182 0.144 0.191 0.167 0.168 0.0964 
RE/Assets 538 -0.525 0.747 -0.521 0.772 -0.532 0.706 
NI/Assets 538 -0.0693 0.124 -0.0686 0.112 -0.0705 0.142 
CF/Assets  538 -0.00587 0.0529 0.00377 0.0499 -0.0211 0.0540 
Earnings/Assets  537 -0.0683 0.123 -0.0685 0.110 -0.0679 0.140 
Leverage 538 0.422 0.846 0.406 0.790 0.446 0.928 
Cash Flow Vol 534 0.0363 0.0267 0.0410 0.0268 0.0287 0.0248 
Earnings Vol 534 0.0447 0.0460 0.0494 0.0502 0.0373 0.0374 
Sales Vol 534 0.0435 0.0521 0.0518 0.0613 0.0306 0.0284 
Leverage Vol 534 0.159 0.248 0.151 0.227 0.172 0.278 
log(Assets) 538 8.676 1.630 8.139 1.760 9.528 0.883 
B/A Spread 465 3.151 5.025 3.228 5.513 3.031 4.158 
SD(B/A Spread) 449 0.987 1.891 0.936 1.936 1.067 1.821 
Summary statistics for all bonds in my sample (Panel A), bonds not in CDS auction (Panel B), and bonds in 
CDS auction (Panel C) for time period BDEF6. Observations are reported at the bond level. All variables are 
defined as in Table 2. 
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Table A4: Summary Stats DEFA 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
All Bonds Bonds Not in CDS 
Auction 
Bonds in CDS Auction 
VARIABLES N mean std mean std mean std 
Number of Trades 554 170.9 294.1 127.5 272.7 234.2 312.9 
Volume Traded 554 597.9 121.2 329.8 607.4 989.9 168.1 
Daily Return 549 0.00504 0.143 0.0144 0.0961 -0.00846 0.190 
Daily Volatility  524 0.0863 0.172 0.0633 0.111 0.119 0.229 
Annual Volatility 524 1.304 2.497 0.893 0.960 1.886 3.634 
Rating  455 17.11 2.115 17.08 2.064 17.18 2.223 
Bond Zero 554 52.93 29.41 55.84 30.95 48.67 26.50 
Age 547 5.957 4.790 4.994 3.758 7.410 5.732 
Maturity 547 5.831 6.958 5.500 7.667 6.331 5.704 
IRC 544 2.894 4.424 2.058 3.679 4.117 5.096 
Amihud 554 0.00670 0.0180 0.00608 0.0114 0.00760 0.0248 
SD(IRC) 506 2.979 4.634 2.182 3.655 4.129 5.574 
SD(Amihud) 529 0.0111 0.0293 0.0112 0.0332 0.0110 0.0227 
Log(Amt) 547 19.88 0.923 19.81 0.804 19.99 1.070 
CDS Auction 554 0.406 0.492 0 0 1 0 
CDS Firm 554 0.807 0.394 0.687 0.463 0.982 0.132 
EBIT/Assets 503 -0.0222 0.109 -0.0222 0.0784 -0.0222 0.143 
Coverage Ratio 509 -0.566 7.296 -0.537 6.018 -0.609 8.862 
Sales/Assets 503 0.181 0.145 0.189 0.169 0.169 0.0969 
RE/Assets 503 -0.536 0.750 -0.532 0.777 -0.540 0.711 
NI/Assets 503 -0.0703 0.127 -0.0699 0.115 -0.0709 0.143 
CF/Assets  503 -0.00694 0.0535 0.00317 0.0512 -0.0218 0.0535 
Earnings/Assets  502 -0.0693 0.125 -0.0699 0.114 -0.0683 0.141 
Leverage 503 0.440 0.866 0.427 0.818 0.459 0.935 
Cash Flow Vol 501 0.0360 0.0266 0.0408 0.0267 0.0289 0.0249 
Earnings Vol 501 0.0457 0.0471 0.0510 0.0519 0.0379 0.0378 
Sales Vol 501 0.0435 0.0529 0.0518 0.0629 0.0312 0.0293 
Leverage Vol 501 0.164 0.253 0.155 0.233 0.176 0.279 
log(Assets) 503 8.785 1.593 8.254 1.742 9.563 0.890 
B/A Spread 356 2.432 4.368 2.315 4.768 2.602 3.721 
SD(B/A Spread) 338 0.770 1.963 0.622 2.016 0.976 1.874 
Summary statistics for all bonds in my sample (Panel A), bonds not in CDS auction (Panel B), and bonds in 
CDS auction (Panel C) for time period DEFA. Observations are reported at the bond level. All variables are 
defined as in Table 2.  
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